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TRANSFERS OF JOINT PROPERTY IN 
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH 
A CALL FOR IMMEDIATE STATUTORY REVISION 
L. Hart Wrigh_t* 
No. 1 
F OR years the Tax Court sided with the government and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in asserting that the 
contemplation-of-death provision1 of the estate tax act was suffi-
ciently elastic to include the tax concept of ownership reflected 
in the joint-property provision2 of the same act.8 The alliance be-
tween those tribunals on this point was recently broken, how-
ever, when the Tax Court shifted to the competing view sup-
ported by taxpayers4 and the appellate court for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.5 It now believes that the two provisions mentioned above 
are complete strangers even though at one time these two were 
consecutive subsections of the same section.6 The consequence, if 
that court is right: Certain inter vivos arrangements, though en-
tered into in contemplation of death, will effectively and sub-
stantially reduce anticipated estate taxes which would otherwise 
be assessed. This saving is effected by an exclusion from the 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan; A.B. 1939, LL.B. 1941, University of 
Oklahoma, LL.M. 1942, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
l I.R.C. (1939), §811 (c), now I.R.C., §2035. 
21.R.C. (1939), §811 (e), now I.R.C., §2040. 
s Cf. Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll, (3d Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 
653, cert. den. 321 U.S. 764, 64 S.Ct. 521 (1944): Estate of Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 
(1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d} 657; Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943) 
(acq.): Estate of William MacPherson Hornor, 44 B.T.A. 1136 (1941) (nonacq.), alfd. (3d 
Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 649. Cf. also Estate of Edwin W. Rickenberg, 11 T.C. 1 (1948), revd. 
(9th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 114, cert. den. 338 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 487 (1950). 
4Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955): Estate of A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. 
No. 70 (1955): Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952) (acq.). affd. on other 
issues (9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400. 
5 Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 657. Cf. Rickenberg 
v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 114, cert. den. 338 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 487 
(1950). See also Baltimore Nat. Bank, Exrs. v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 
642. 
6 Revenue Act of 1916, §202 (b) and (c). 
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gross estate and will, if the arrangement is properly planned, be 
in addition to that expected from the marital deduction. 
The Tax Court was concerned with the death duties to be 
exacted from the estates of two different husbands, each of whom 
during life had furnished the entire cost of acquiring certain 
property which each then held for several years with his wife 
as tenants by the entireties. 
Decedent X and his wife W, shortly before and "in contem-
plation of his death," executed ·the necessary instruments to effect 
an immediate division of their entireties property between them. 
The Commissioner's determination, calling for inclusion of the 
entire property in the decedent-husband's gross estate, was re-
jected. The Tax Court concluded that W's interest should be 
excluded from her husband's gross estate even though the whole 
would have been included under the joint property provision had 
the arrangement in contemplation of his death not been effected.7 
Decedent Y and his wife W, in contemplation · also of his 
death, established a trust with the property which they had held 
as tenants by the entireties. The income from the trust was to 
be divided between them for their joint lives, then to the survivor 
for his life, remainder over. Again the court upset the Commis-
sioner's determination by holding that the parties had success-
fully reduced that amount which otherwise would have been in-
cluded in the husband's gross estate under the joint-property 
provision. Now only the one-half which, according to local law, 
he had transferred to the trust was includible at his death.8 
Proper Tax Policy. Policy-wise these decisions obviously 
give rise to absurd results. From the inception of the estate tax, 
the act has required the value of entireties property to be included 
in the gross estate of a decedent in the proportion to which he 
had furnished the consideration for the original acquisition.9 
Inclusion of the whole in H's gross estate where he had furnished 
the entire consideration did not mean that the draftsman of that 
section was ignorant of the fact that under local law H's wife 
had acquired some sort of interest in the corpus before his death. 
A tax on the entire value was justified, in spite of that fact, on 
7 Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955). 
s Estate of A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. No. 70 (1955). Cf. Estate of Don Murillo Brockway. 
18 T.C. 488 (1952) (acq.), affd. on other issues (9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400. 
9Revenue Act of 1916, §202(c), now I.R.C., §2040. 
1956] JOINT PROPERTY AND CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH 3 
the theory that H's death .was really the pivotal event which 
brought to fruition W's interest in the corpus, as distinguished 
from any income interest she may·have had. If she had died.first, 
her chance to get the fee, a matter dependent solely upon sur-
vivorship, wo11ld have been cut off. Since H's death alone made 
W's interest in the corpus certain, such estates were deemed by 
Congress to be sufficiently testamentary in character to warrant 
taxing them as though H had held the entire fee until the very 
moment of his death.10 
The decedents in the two·cases before the Tax Court sought 
to avoid this latter equation, that is, sought to avoid the impact 
of the statutory language dealing with jointly held property by 
concluding a second inter vivos arrangement which eliminated the 
joint character of their estate. Normally, of course, the estate 
tax act does not freeze tax incidence according to the original 
way in which a taxpayer may have held his property. One is 
usually free to re-arrange his affairs during his life and to expect 
that death duties will be determined in accordance with that 
re-arrangement. But this is only generally true. Again from the 
inception of the estate tax, the act has also incorporated a special 
provision designed to reach certain inter vivos arrangements en-
tered into in contemplation of death.11 Here, too, the underlying 
conception has rested on the testamentary flavor of such arrange-
ments.12 That the contemplation-of-death principle equates with 
ordinary testamentary transfers those transactions which are inter 
vivos primarily only in terms of ·form is another way of saying 
that the contemplation-of-death principle is essential in preserv-
ing the integrity of the estate tax theory against unwarranted 
avoidance. 
If it is assumed, as it is here, that both of the statutory pro-
visions just described deserve to be retained in the code,13 sound 
10 This was the explanation made of that section by the Supreme Court when it 
turned aside charges of unconstitutionality. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 59 
S.Ct. 551 (1939). Thus the joint-property provision is geared to the same basic philosophy 
as that which was attn"buted to I.R.C. (1939), §811 (c) (1) (C), now I.R.C., §2037. Helvering 
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940). 
11 Revenue Act of 1916, §202 (b), now I.R.C., §2035. 
12 United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 51 S.Ct. 446 (1931). 
13 However, aside from the basic problem considered here, the joint-property provi-
sion should also be amended for the purpose of deleting one clause. In determining who 
furnished the original consideration, that section now provides that any part of the con-
sideration literally furnished by the survivor will be attributed to the decedent if it is 
shown that the consideration in question was acquired "at any time" by the survivor from 
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tax policy requires that the contemplation-of-death principle be 
sufficiently broad in its conception to protect the joint-property 
provision as well as those other subsections which serve to identify 
the gross estate. This means that the ownership and transfer 
principles of the joint-property provision-nothing more nor less 
than tax concepts-must be imported by construction or amend-
ment into the contemplation-of-death provision. In a loose sense, 
this would in effect neutralize for tax purposes any inter vivos 
arrangement affecting entireties property where the arrangement 
was entered into in contemplation of the death of that tenant 
who furnished the original consideration.14 The whole of joint 
or entireties property would then be included in his gross estate 
if such would have been the case under the joint-property pro-
vision absent the later and now neutralized transaction. 
If the tax concept of the joint-property provision is not 
imported into the contemplation-of-death provision, then the 
whole purpose of the former can be easily and intentionally de-
feated by a taxpayer up until the very moment before his death 
by effecting another arrangement which is equally testamentary 
in character because entered into in contemplation of his death. 
the decedent without full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. This 
attributes to a decedent consideration which the survivor may have owned as completely 
separate property for many years. See Estate of N. Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650 (1945) (acq.). 
Similar statutory language is not contained in I.R.C. (1954), §2037 where, absent the 
applicability of the Step Transactions Doctrine, the survivor, not the decedent, would be 
deemed the transferor in such case. Since, with reference to interests in the corpus, jointly 
held property is similar in all economic respects to the types of situations covered by 
§2037 [see, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940)], the two should 
"have the same general transfer concept. 
14 That this would be true only in a loose sense stems from the fact that in some 
situations complete neutralization would have effects over and beyond that which would 
follow if nothing more is said than that the words "interest" and "transfer" in the con-
templation-of-death provision will be deemed to embrace the ownership and transfer 
concept of the joint-property provision. Illustratively, consider the effect of complete 
neutralization on a transfer of jointly held property by the two tenants in contemplation 
of one tenant's death, the income therefrom to be accumulated until his death, the corpus 
and income to be distributed then to S and his heirs. If the decedent had furnished the 
consideration with which the jointly held property was acquired, complete neutralization 
of the subsequent arrangement would also result in including in the gross estate at least 
one-half and perhaps all of the accumulated income as well as all of the original corpus. 
However, the reference in the contemplation-of-death provision to an "interest" of which 
the "decedent" has made a transfer has been construed as a limitation which serves to 
exclude all of the accumulated income from the decedent's gross estate. Burns v. Com-
missioner, (5th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 739. Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of James D. Mc-
Dermott, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 665; Estate of Daniel Guggenheim, 40 B.T .A. 181 
(1939), modified and affd. (2d Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 469, cert. den. 314 U.S. 621, 62 S.Ct. 
66 (1941). The point is that one can ·argue that the "transfer" concept of the contempla· 
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Just as two wrongs never make a right, so two transactions,111 
both of which are essentially testamentary in character, can hardly 
produce a result to which we can even in part justifiably assign 
an inter vivos complexion for tax purposes. 
Identification of the Precise Statutory Issue. There are three 
main types of inter vivos arrangements which could involve sub-
stantial estate tax savings under the Tax Court's theory even 
though such transactions were entered into just before and in con-
templation of the husband's death: 
(1) 
(2) 
Hand W could go through the necessary procedure to 
divide between them the entireties property originally 
acquired with H's funds. They might, e.g., emerge as 
tenants in common; 
H could transfer his undivided entireties interest to W; 
or 
(3) H and W could transfer their respective interests to S 
and his heirs.16 
The first interpretative difficulty in determining on the hus-
band's death the present estate tax consequences of all three 
tion-of-death provision should embrace the transfer concept of the joint-property provi-
sion without arguing that the word "transfer" in the former is without any limiting effect 
at all. That is not to say as a matter of policy and as a general proposition that the 
contemplation-of-death principle should not be so designed as to reach the accumulated 
income in such cases. 
Complete neutralization, as distinguished from importation of the joint-property 
transfer concept, might also lead to inclusion in the gross estate of the amount of the gift 
tax which the decedent earlier paid the federal government and with reference to which he 
would be entitled to a credit if the whole of the joint property is also included in his 
gross estate. I.R.C., §2012. 
llS The first is the creation of the joint estate; the second is the joint transfer in con-
templation of the first tenant's death. 
16 The exact extent by which death duties will be reduced because of the exclusion 
permitted under the Tax Court's theory will depend upon a variety of circumstances. 
Indeed, in some cases there will be no saving at all. Assume, e.g., that prior to the 
execution of the final arrangement, the husband's anticipated adjusted gross estate, con-
sisting only of jointly held property p~rchased by him, is $120,000. A division of that 
property during life would not reduce the death duty at all if it is intended that the wife 
is eventually to get his whole estate. In that case, the exemption and the marital deduc-
tion, standing alone, would have immunized the whole at his death. On the other hand, 
if the anticipated adjusted gross estate had been $240,000, the exemption and the marital 
deduction would have freed only $180,000 from tax. But a division of the property during 
life, the retained one-half going to W at H's death, would free the whole $240,000 from 
death duties. 
In computing anticipated overall savings from a plan which relies upon the Tax 
Court's theory, account must also be taken of the possible gift tax implications of the 
plan. 
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such arrangements is attributable to differences in the literal 
language of the two sections under consideration. The provision 
dealing with jointly held property does not literally provide that 
where one joint tenant furnished the entire consideration, he 
sh'.311 be deemed to have been the owner in fee for purposes of the 
whole estate tax act. The literal approach of that section is less 
sweeping. Where one tenant furnished the original considera-
tion, the act simply provides that the entire value of such en-
tireties property held at his death shall be included in his gross 
estate.17 On the other hand, the provision regarding contem-
plation of death has literally called only for inclusion of that 
"interest ... of which the decedent has ... made a transfer ... 
in contemplation of his death."18 
In cases where the husband during his life transferred his own 
undivided entireties· interest to W or where they jointly trans-
ferred their total interests to T, the joint property provision was 
no longer directly applicable at the moment of his death.19 And 
where these arrangements were executed in contemplation of H's 
death, his executor later contended, and the Tax Court held, that 
the only interest .which the decedent in fact ·transferred in that 
contemplation was an undivided one-half interest. Accordingly, 
only that one-half was included in his gross estate.20 And where 
H · and W divided their entireties property between themselves, 
emerging perhaps as tenants in common, H's executor contended, 
and the Tax Court agreed, that H transferred nothing to W "in 
contemplation of his death," for, so the argument goes, she already 
·owned that which was in essence an undivided one-half interest 
even before this arrangement. Under that circumstance, only the 
one-half which H retained was included, for it remained a part of 
his probate estate.21 
In all three cases, the first statutory issue was whether the 
phrase in the. contemplation-of-death provision, "interest ... of 
which the decedent has ... made a transfer .. ·."22 was to be inter-
17 I.R.C., §2040. That section does not in so many words limit its direct applicability 
to property which is jointly held at the moment of death. Read in context, however, that 
must surely be its meaning. But see Estate of Harold W. Grant, 1 T.C. 731 (1943). 
181.R.C. (1939), §811 (c), now I.R.C., §2035. (Italics supplied.) 
19 See note 17 supra. 
20 Estate of A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. No. 70 (1955); Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 
T.C. 488 (1952) (acq.), affd. on other issues (9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400. 
21 Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955). 
221.R.C. (1939), §811 (c), now I.R.C., §2035. 
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preted literally in accordance with H's contention or was to be 
given a broad interpretation so that it would be geared to the 
philosophy of the joint-property provision. Another way of putting 
this question is to ask whether the previously-quoted key phrase 
should be interpreted in accordance with the ownership and trans-
fer principles prevailing under local law, or in accordance with the 
tax concepts of ownership and transfer reflected in the joint-prop-
erty provision of the estate tax act. Only in the latter event could 
the husband be treated as though he owned the whole at the time 
the parties entered into the final arrangement in contemplation of 
his death. 
But even if the latter more expansive interpretation should 
prevail, there is an added question in the case where the entireties 
property is divided between H and W. The additional question 
here is whether such a division would be covered by a stated ex-
ception to the contemplation-of-death provision which immunizes 
a "bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money 
or money's worth."23 Here three subsidiary questions are raised: 
(1) Could such a transaction be considered "bona fide"? (2) Was 
it a "sale"? (3) Was the giving up by the wife of her chance to 
secure the whole through survivorship "full and adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth" for the release by him of 
his chance to get the whole, each now taking one-half? 
MANIFESTATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENTION 
AND THE JUDICIARY'S :REACTION 
The Initial Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Meaning 
of "Interest ... of Which the Decedent Has . .. Made a Transfer." 
When the estate tax act was first adopted in 1916, all matters 
bearing on the determination of the gross estate were included in 
one section.24 Its three subsections then specifically dealt only 
with the following: 
(1) The "interest ... of the decedent at the time of his death 
which is subject to the payment of the charges against 
his estate and the expenses of its administration and is 
subject to distribution as part of his estate";25 
23lbid. 
24 Revenue Act of 1916, §202. 
25 Now, as revised, I.R.C., §2033. (Italics supplied.) 
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(2) An "interest ... of which the decedent has ..• made a 
transfer ... in contemplation of or intended to take effect 
in possession or enjoyment at or after his death";26 and 
(3) Jointly held property under the circumstances previously 
described.27 
The scanty committee reports of that day28 and the discussion 
on the floor of Congress29 included nothing with reference to the 
meaning of the word "interest" which appears in both of the first 
two subsections. Nor was anything else said bearing on the ques-
tion of whether Congress intended the contemplation-of-death 
provision to reflect the ownership and transfer principles em-
bodied in the joint-property provision. However, congressional 
attention was called two years later to a number of the difficulties 
which were then arising in the government's effort to fix the char-
acter of the ownership and transfer principles to be applied in 
connection with the shot-gun clause of the act-the first of the 
three subsections enumerated above. Illustratively, taxpayers' rep-
resentatives were contending that nothing need be included in a 
decedent's gross estate with reference either to the dower interest 
of his surviving wife or his exercise· of a testamentary general 
power of appointment.80 
The developments relating to the powers-of-appointment ques-
tion were to include the first legislative and judicial response to 
the meaning of the statutory word "interest." 
Claimed immunity for property with reference to which a de-
cedent had exercised such a power at his death posed two separate 
statutory issues under the shot-gun clause, only the first of which 
is really relevant here: 
(1) Did the ~ct that he had such a power mean that the 
property subject to the power constituted an "interest ... 
of the decedent"; and 
(2) Even if it did, was his interest of such a character as to 
satisfy the three added conjunctive conditions of the 
shot-gun clause which provided that the government 
26 Now, divided between §§2035 and 2047 in I.R.C. (1954). (Italics supplied.) 
27 Now, as revised, I.R.C., §2040, 
28 One and a half pages were devoted to the whole of the first federal estate tax in 
H. Rep. 922, 64th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 3 and 5 (1916). Only one paragraph was devoted 
to the subject in S. Rep. 793, 64th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1916). 
29 See 53 CoNG, REc., Parts 11 and 13 (1916). 
so See H. Rep. 767, 65th Cong., 2d sess., p. 211 (1918). 
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could reach the decedent's interest only to the extent 
that the property was "subject to the payment of the 
charges against his estate and the expenses of its admin-
istration and is subject to distribution as part of his 
estate." 
9 
Before these two issues were resolved by the judiciary, Con-
gress in 1918 responded adversely, but only prospectively so, to 
taxpayers' claims of immunity by incorporating new subsections 
specifically dealing with powers of appointment as well as with 
the dower interest of a surviving spouse.31 
Those who drafted the new subsection bearing on the testa-
mentary exercise of a power of appointment were aware that a 
question also might thereafter arise as to whether Congress in-
tended an (1) exercise of a (2) power during life but in contem-
plation of death to be equated with~ and thus covered by, that 
language in the general contemplation-of-death provision which 
literally embraced only a (1) "transfer" by a decedent of (2) an 
"interest" in property. While the Congress itself responded to the 
problem reflected by this question, it did not respond to the pre-
cise question itself. It attacked from the flank, and again only with 
prospective effect, by including specific language in the power-of-
appointment subsection calling for inclusion in a decedent's gross 
estate where his power was exercised in contemplation of his 
death.82 That this particular drafting technique was chosen to 
resolve the anticipated difficulty did not necessarily mean, how-
ever, that Congress thought in 1918 that the general contempla-
tion-of-death provision would fail by construction, in the case of 
those who died prior to 1918, to reflect the ownership and transfer 
concept which was now being embodied on a prospective basis 
in the new power-of-appointment subsection. In fact, the sponsor- · 
ing committee's report stated that all of the foregoing changes 
were "for the purpose of clarifying rather than extending the 
existing statute.''33 But that the committee was not wholly sure 
of this stated position may or may not have been indicated in one 
of the succeeding sentences of the same report to the effect that 
the "absence of a provision including property transferred by a 
power of appointment makes it possible, by resorting to the crea-
tion of such a power, to effect two transfers of an estate with the 
81 Revenue Act of 1918, §402 (e), now reflected in I.R.C., §2041. 
82 Id., §420 (e), now reflected in I.R.C., §2041 (a) (1) (B) and (a) (2). 
88 H. Rep. 767, 65th Cong., 2d sess., p. 21 (1918). • 
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payment of only one tax."34 The one tax to which that statement 
referred was, of course, the tax originally paid by the donor of the 
power. 
Three years later, in United States v. Field,35 the Supreme 
Court had occasion to deal .with the meaning of "interest" in both 
of the first two original subsections. The context involved a de-
cedent who had exercised a testamentary power of appointment, 
having died before the effective date of the statutory changes 
above. Taxability here turned first on the shot-gun clause. The 
Court doubted that any weight could be attached to the belated 
statement by the congressional committee to the effect that the 
foregoing statutory changes simply clarified, without extending, 
the sweep of the shot-gun clause. It noted in this connection that 
the same report had indicated, as stated above, that absent those 
statutory changes there would be no tax on the estate of the donee 
of a power. It then relied upon local law in arriving at a negative 
answer to the two enumerated issues noted above. In keeping 
with general property law notions, it concluded first that the sub-
ject matter of the power was not the property of, i. e., was not the 
"interest" of, -"the decedent."36 Nor with reference to the quali-
fying conditions of the shot-gun clause did the Court think the 
property passed as a part of "his estate,"37 as distinguished from 
the estate of the donor of the power. 
The government also insisted that the second subsection of 
the gross-estate provision justified the tax. That section, it will 
be recalled, related to an "interest ... of which the decedent has 
... made a transfer ... in contemplation of or intended to take 
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death ... .''38 The 
government argued that the testamentary exercise postponed the 
possession or enjoyment of the beneficiary until decedent's death.39 
34 Id. at p. 22. (Italics supplied.) 
35 255 U.S. 257, 41 S.Ct. 256 (1921). 
- 36 Revenue Act of 1916, §202 (a), now, as modified, I.R.C., §2033. 
87 The view was taken even though the decedent's creditors could have looked to the 
appointed property for satisfaction of claims against that estate if the other assets were 
insufficient. Significant here was the fact that any excess over creditors' claims went not 
to the next of kin or to legatees but to appointees. 
38 Revenue Act of 1916, §202 (b), now divided between §§2035 and 2037, I.R.C. (1954). 
(Italics supplied.) 
39 While the court chose to meet the government's contention on the latter's own 
ground, it could have also· rejected this contention on the theory that §202 (b) of the 
Revenue Act of 1916, now divided between I.R.C., §§2035 and 2037, related only to inter 
vivas transfers with a testamentary complexion and that §202 (a), now I.R.C., §2033, pre• 
empted the field with reference to the shifting of interests where all facets of the transfer 
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Since the three qualifying conditions of the shot-gun clause had 
not been repeated in this subsection, the basic issue to which the 
Court addressed its attention was whether the word "interest" 
here had the same meaning which had been given to it in the con-
text of the shot-gun clause. The Court answered this affirmatively. 
In short, the word "interest" in the subsection which also con-
tained the general contemplation-of-death principle was said to 
relate only to interests of the decedent as prescribed by local law. 
The Subsequent Role of United States v. Field. Following 
the Field decision, though we are not expressly told that it was 
the cause, care was taken by Congress when new subsections were 
added to the gross-estate provisions of the old code to insert lan-
guage in the new subsection itself which would expressly tie the 
new ownership and transfer principle proclaimed by it-again 
nothing more nor less than a federal tax concept-to the contem-
plation-of-death principle. For example, the revocable-trust pro-
vision, adopted first in 1924, specifically provided, inter alia, that 
a release in contemplation of death of the donor's reserved power 
over the trust would bring into his gross estate that property sub-
ject to the power.40 However, the Congress never did go back to 
the joint-property provision for the purpose of inserting an ex-
press link of this type. 
It was with this background that a lower court first approached 
the question with which this article is directly concerned. In 
Estate of William MacPherson Horner,41 entireties property for 
which the decedent-husband had originally furnished the consid-
eration was transferred by the two spouses in contemplation of his 
death to a trust, the income being reserved for their joint lives,. 
then to the survivor for his life, remainder over, but with a pos-
sibility of reverter in the spouses. A power of revocation, never 
to be exercised, was also retained by the two spouses for their 
joint lives. The government sought to include the whole of the 
corpus in the decedent-husband's gross estate. 
took place at death. This reasoning would have centered attention only on the latter 
subsection. 
-!O Revenue Act of 1924, §302 (d), now I.R.C., §2038. Shortly thereafter Congress also 
added special language in the revocable-transfer section tying that principle to the then 
newly initiated presumption which was applied to transfers made shortly before death; 
See Revenue Act of 1926, §302. Later the presumption was also linked to the powers-of. 
appointment principle. Revenue Act of 1950, §501 (a), adding §811 (1) to I.R.C. (1939). 
Both of these links are now consolidated in I.R.C., §2035 (b). 
-!144 B.T .A. 1136 (1941). 
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Since the reserved power was never exercised, the specific 
language in the revocable-trust provision dealing with the exer-
cise of such powers during life but in contemplation of death was, 
of course, inapplicable. The case was to turn on other portions 
of that subsection and on two other provisions, the same pivotal 
issue being common to all three. These subsections dealt respec-
tively with the tax effects of the possibility of reverter,42 the power 
of revocation,43 and the fact that the trust had been established by 
the spouses with entireties property in contemplation of H's 
death.44 All three subsections literally related only to that "inter-
est" of which the "decedent" had made a "transfer." The common 
question, therefore, was whether the ownership and transfer prin-
ciple of the joint-property provision45-a federal tax concept-
would be read into those other subsections. 
Judge Sternhagen, in an opinion reviewed by the whole Board, 
ignored without citation what had been said by the Supreme 
Court in the Field case and now answered this affirmatively. He 
stated that under these circumstances a "trust created by joint 
tenants or tenants by the entirety has no greater force to keep the 
property from the gross estate of one of the settlers than would a 
similar trust created by an individual."46 Since the decedent's es-
tate had failed to show that the transfer in trust, made within two 
years of his death at age 76, was not made in contemplation of 
death, "for this reason, if for no other, the property transferred 
is within the gross estate."47 Of course, he did add that the other 
two subsections could also be invoked for the same reasons. 
The common issue on which the Board had turned the case 
was dodged by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit when 
the matter came before it. That appellate court rested on the 
questionable conclusion that the interest of the two parties in the 
trust was still in the nature of a joint interest and was, therefore, 
still covered by the joint-property provision.48 The Tax Court, 
successor to the Board, continued, however, to adhere to its first 
42Revenue Act of 1926, §302(c), now I.R.C., §2037. 
4Sid., §302(d), now-I.R.C., §2038. 
44 Id., §302 (c), now I.R.C., §2035. 
45 Id., §302 (e), now I.R.C., §2040. 
4644 B.T.A. 1136 at 1140 (1941). 
47 Id. at 1139. 
48 Homer's Estate v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 649. 
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philosophy49 and was finally joined on the point in 1943 by the 
above appellate court.50 
The Tax Court applied its view in cases where the husband 
and wife transferred the entireties property to third persons in 
contemplation of his death,51 where the husband transferred his 
remaining undivided interest to his wife,52 and where such prop-
erty was divided between them.53 In the latter situations, however, 
that tribunal was also compelled to consider the additional issue 
of whether the division between the spouses was a "bona fide sale 
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's 
worth." This immunizing language was thought not to apply for 
three reasons.54 A transaction between spouses, designed solely 
for the purpose of reducing estate taxes, was not considered "bona 
fide." Less persuasive, if only for reasons of policy, was the con-
clusion that the word "sale" did not embrace exchanges, bona 
fide or otherwise. And most persuasive was the conclusion that 
any quid pro quo which failed to replenish the decedent's taxable 
estate fell short of "full and adequate consideration in money or 
money's worth." The legislative history of another provision af-
forded some indirect support -for this latter construction. 
In this latter connection, after Congress had added the pro-
vision which specifically required the dower interest of a dece-
dent's surviving spouse to be included in the decedent's gross 
49Estate of Frank K.. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 
657; Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943) (acq.); Estate of Harold W. Grant, 1 T.C. 
731 (1943). 
50 The Tax Court's theory was adopted in Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh 
v. Driscoll, (D.C. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 949, which was then affd. per curiam (3d Cir. 1943) 
137 F. (2d) 653, cert. den. 321 U.S. 764, 64 S.Ct. 521 (1944). 
51 Estate of Frank K.. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 657. 
52 Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943) (acq.). Cf. Estate of Harold W. Grant, 
1 T.C. 731 (1943). 
58 Estate of Frank K.. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 
657. The transfer concept of the joint-property section was also read by the Tax Court 
into the section of the old code dealing with insurance. However, the language of that 
provision, I.R.C. (1939), §811 (g) (2), was somewhat more accommodating than is the lan-
guage of the contemplation-of-death provision. The insurance section provided, inter alia, 
that insurance proceeds would be included in a decedent's gross estate in the proportion 
to which he had "directly or indirectly" paid the premiums. Where the surviving wife 
paid the premiums from a joint bank account traceable originally to separate funds of her 
decedent-husband, the latter was said to have indirectly paid them. Estate of A. D. 
Saunders, 14 T.C. 534 (1950). Cf. Rule v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 351. 
As applied to community.property, this concept was codified in the provision dealing with 
insurance. Revenue Act of 1942, §404 (a), adding §811 (g) (4) to I.R.C. (1939). 
54Estate of Frank K.. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd. (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 
657. 
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estate,55 the question arose whether a contract between spouses, 
calling upon H to leave a sum to W in lieu of dower, was supported 
for tax purposes by full and adequate consideration so as to justify 
a subsequent deduction for a claim filed by the surviving spouse. 
Accompanying a subsequent specific and adverse legislative re-
sponse to this56 was the sponsoring congressional committee's 
comment that previous contrary holdings amounted "to a subver-
sion of the legislative intent"57 reflected in the earlier provision 
which called for inclusion of dower in the gross estate. This was 
some indication that Congress contemplated that "full and ade-
quate consideration in money or money's worth" was not satisfied 
by a quid pro quo which, in the absence of the transaction in 
question, would have been included in any ev:ent in the decedent's 
gross estate. Later in 1945 the Supreme Court in Merrill v. Fahs58 
indicated that the above amendment by Congress was simply de-
claratory of the meaning which would have been assigned, absent 
the amel}.dment, to the full-and-adequate-consideration require-
ment. However, in 1949 the appellate court for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, concerned with a division of entireties property between the 
spouses in contemplation of the -husband's death, ignored the 
implications of the Merrill decision. But of even more sweeping 
effect was its total rejection also of the Tax Court's views with 
reference to the relationship between the contemplation-of-death 
provision and the joint-property subsection.59 
That appellate court concluded that the contemplation-of-
death provision was not in pari materia with the joint-property 
subsection. While no reference was made to the Supreme Court's 
much earlier analysis in the Field case, this court of appeals did,. 
nevertheless, conclude that the contemplation-of-death provision 
was geared under these circumstances to the principles of owner-
ship prevailing under local law. Accordingly, that court could not 
see how it could be said that a husband had transferred in con-
templation of his death an interest which his wife already owned 
in their entireties property. Having reached that conclusion it 
was relatively unimportant in this case that the court also refused 
to subscribe to the trial court's view with reference to the meaning 
55 Revenue Act of 19i8, §402 (b), now I.R.C., §2034. 
56 Revenue Act of 1932, §804, now I.R.C., §§2053 (d) and 2043 (b). 
57 H. Rep. 708, 72d Cong., 1st sess., p. 47 (1932). 
58 324 U.S. 308, 65 S.Ct. 655 (1945). 
59Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 657. 
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of the full-and-adequate-consideration clause. It seemed, neverthe-
less, to think that the Tax Court's view on this matter was simply 
another way, a backhanded one at that, of reading the tax concept 
of ownership reflected in the joint-property provision into the 
contemplation-of-death subsection. 
That same appellate court had another opportunity in the 
same year to reaffirm its overall philosophy. A husband and wife 
in contemplation of his death voluntarily divided community 
property which was traceable to his earnings. They were attempt-
ing to avoid that language which was inserted into a new 
paragraph in the joint-property subsection in 1942 calling for 
inclusion in the husband's gross estate of the entire value of that 
community property which had originated with him. In keeping 
with earlier practice, Congress had simultaneously written into 
that same paragraph a provision tying that particular ownership 
principle, a tax concept, to the contemplation-of-death principle.60 
Unfortunately, however, those two principles were expressly 
linked in the new paragraph only in the case where such com-
munity property was transferred by the husband and wife to a 
third person. This meant that a division of such property between 
spouses in contemplation of the husband's death would result in 
inclusion of the whole in his gross estate only if the general con-
templation-of-death provision was deemed to embody the tax 
concept of ownership reflected in the then new provision dealing 
with community property. But again the court in question insisted 
that the general contemplation-of-death provision could not be 
so construed.61 A little more than a month later, however, Con-
gress furnished some evidence, if only by implication, that it 
thought the transfer concept in the general contemplation-of-
death provision was sufficiently elastic to embrace at least one 
federal tax concept as distinguished from the principle prevailing 
under local law. 
The medium for this expression was the Technical Changes 
Act of 1949.62 There, it will be recalled, Congress, inter alia, 
sought to cushion the alleged hardship which arose out of the 
judicially-inspired but long delayed demise of May v. Heiner.63 
60 Revenue Act of 1942, §402 (a), ·adding §811 (d) (5) to I.R.C. (1939). 
61 Rickenberg v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 114, cert. den. 338 U.S. 949, 
70 S.Ct. 487 (1950). 
62 Act of Oct. 25, 1949, PL. 378, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. L 891. 
63 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286 (1930), overruled by Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 
335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322 (1949), reh. den. 336 U.S. 915, 69 S.Ct. 599 (1949). 
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Back in 1931 Congress had inserted into an old subsection, 
dealing with transfers in contemplation of or intended to take 
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the decedent's death, 
specific language to the effect that there would also be included 
in the gross estate any property which a decedent transferred 
after that date if he retained the income or the possession and 
enjoyment for his life.64 That amendment was further expanded 
in 1932 to reach cases where, inter alia, an interest in the income 
was retained for a period which was not ascertainable without 
reference to the decedent's death.65 Neither of these amendments 
of that old subsection expressly identified the tax consequence 
which would follow if such a decedent subsequently, but during 
life, sought to escape the impact of that language by an assign-
ment or surrender of his retained life estate in contemplation of 
his death. Literally, the precise subject matter of that second 
transfer would have no value at his death, for the life estate would 
be exhausted coincident with that pivotal dateline. Accordingly, 
if the phrase which was common to the whole subsection, 
"interest ... of which the decedent has ... made a transfer," was 
construed in a contemplation of death context so as to embrace 
only the notions of ownership and transfer prevailing under local 
law, there would be nothing to include in such a decedent's gross 
estate. On the other hand, the corpus itself would be included if 
that phrase was deemed to reflect the overall tax transfer concept 
of the 1931 and 1932 amendments. 
That Congress at least later supposed in 1949 that the latter 
would be the case is indicated by the way in which it referred to 
the problem in the Technical Changes Act of that year. There, of 
course, it was primarily concerned with the fact that the Supreme 
Court had just held under other language of the same s~bsection 
(the traditional "possession and enjoyment" clause) that transfers 
before 193 I would also be included in the gross estate if the dece-
dent had retained a life estate.66 In cushioning the alleged hard-
ship of this holding, Congress first provided that life estates 
reserved prior to the pivotal dateline, 1931, could be assigned 
64 Joint Res. of March 3, 1931, 71st Cong., 3d sess., 46 Stat. L. 1516, now in I.R.C., 
§2036. It took a decision by the -Supreme Court to demonstrate that this amendment was 
only to have prospective effect. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559 (1938). 
65 Revenue Act of 1932, §803 (a), now in I.R.C., §2036. 
66 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322 (1949), reh. den. 336 
U.S. 915, 69 S.Ct. 599 (1949). 
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during 1949 and 1950 without gift tax incidence.67 More impor-
tant here, however, was the further provision to the effect that 
such assignments would "not be deemed to have been made in 
contemplation of death .... "68 It does not expressly appear wheth-
er Congress deemed it absolutely necessary that it express this 
dispensation. But that it thought so appears from the further fact 
that the previously quoted negative and immunizing statement 
with reference to contemplation of death was said not to apply to 
the assignment, inter alia, of a retained life estate if the original 
transfer of the corpus was made between 1931 and 1932 and if 
that corpus would have been reached, absent the subsequent as-
signment of the income interest, by the 1931 amendment standing 
alone. 69 On the one hand, it is true that Congress used a double 
negative. It did not affirmatively say that the one word, "interest," 
which identified the subject matter of the contemplation-of-death 
clause as well as that of the possession-and-enjoyment clause, was 
to be interpreted in such case so as to include the entire corpus. 
But that seems obviously to have been the legislative supposition. 
And while nothing whatever was said with reference to such as-
signments of a retained life estate where the original inter vivos 
transfer of the corpus was made after 1932, it would be difficult 
to argue persuasively that Congress intended that assignments of 
such life estates, though in contemplation of death, would free the 
corpus of the death duty. Yet literally, taxability of the corpus 
would follow only if a court would read the special tax-transfer 
concept, relating to retained life estates, into the general contem-
plation-of-death clause. However, if the legislative intention was 
clear, though not adequately expressed, it is not unknown for a 
court to conform the statute to the intention. Indeed, in other 
contexts the Supreme Court has so responded even where the 
statutory words were exactly opposite to the legislative intention 
otherwise expressed.70 
Without expressly considering the indirect significance of any 
of this legislative history, the Tax Court in 1952 shifted its long-
67 Act of Oct. 25, 1949, P.L. 378, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. L. 891, §8. Cf. §6. 
68 Ibid. By virtue of the provisions in the new code, freeing from tax those transfers 
which originated before March 3, 1931, this provision has lost its practical importance. 
I.R.C., §2036. 
69 The same was true if the property would have been reached, absent the assignment, 
under I.R.C. (1939), §811 (d). 
70 Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559 (1938), where the Court relied upon a 
statement made on the floor of the House to completely neutralize language to the con-
trary in the statute. 
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standing position by adopting the view of the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit to the effect that the words "interest" and 
"transfer" in the contemplation-of-death provision were geared to 
the ownership principles prevailing under local law and thus did 
not incorporate the tax concepts reflected in the joint-property 
subsection. 71 This attitude was solidified by two like decisions in 
1955.72 Indeed, in the interim, even the Commissioner conceded 
that this was the case with reference to situations which arose prior 
to 1948 where community property traceable to the husband's 
earnings was divided between the spouses in contemplation of his 
death.73 But that particular situation might be distinguished from 
cases involving other types of jointly held property where, prior 
to the last transaction, there was a right of survivorship. Congress 
had inserted into the community-property paragraphs an all too 
narrow specific link between transfers of community property and 
the contemplation-of-death principle, and might thereby be said 
to have pre-empted the community property field. In any event 
the government did continue thereafter to litigate in the context 
of other types of jointly held property the basic question with 
which this article is concerned.74 Now, however, while the evi-
dence is inconclusive, there is some reason to believe that the gov-
ernment may have given up the ghost.75 
The Effect of the 1954 Code. The only new provision added 
by the 1954 code which might affect the answer to the problem 
considered here is to be found in that chapter of the new code 
which deals with gift taxes. 
Section 2515 now provides that the creation of, or the enlarge-
ment of the equity in, a joint tenancy between spouses in real 
property, or a similar entireties estate, is not to be deemed a 
trans/ er for purposes of that chapter unless the donor elects 
71 Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952) (acq.), affd. on other issues 
(9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400. 
72 Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955); Estate of A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. 
No. 70 (1955). 
73 U.S. Treas. Dec. 6016, May 29, 1953, amending U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.15. 
74 Estate of Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. No. 78 (1955); Estate of A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. 
No. 70 (1955). 
75 In October 1955 it acquiesced in Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 
(1952) (acq.), affd. {9th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 400, almost two months before it tested 
the same issue in the Carnall and Bomer cases. Int. Rev. Bui. 1955-41, p. 7. Cf. the gov-
ernment's admission back in 1951 in Steen v. United States, (D.C. Cal. 1951) 51-1 U.S.T.C. 
,il0,818, alfd. on other issues (9th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 379, cert. den. 344 U.S. 822, 73 
~n~~ . 
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otherwise in a gift tax return. Now the donor spouse will normally 
be deemed to have made a gift on the termination ( other than by 
reason of death) of such estates to the extent the proportion of 
the proceeds received by such spouse is less than the proportion 
of the total original consideration furnished by him. 
Importation now of this ownership and transfer principle into 
the contemplation-of-death provision would certainly seem to re-
quire the Tax Court to shift the position which it has recently 
been taking in the cases first discussed. Unfortunately, however, 
it is not at all clear that the principle of the above provision will 
be imported into the general contemplation-of-death clause.76 The 
literal language of the new provision specifically limits its appli-
cability to the gift tax chapter. The contemplation-of-death provi-
sion resides elsewhere, in the preceding chapter which covers the 
estate tax. However, since the gift tax was intended to supplement 
the estate tax, it is common for courts to treat them in pari materia. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court did just that in a previously discussed 
case which raised a problem somewhat similar to that involved 
here. It will be recalled in this connection that the claims provi-
sion in the subchapter of the old code on estate taxes was amended 
to provide that the relinquishment by contract of dower or other 
marital rights in return for other promised benefits would not 
satisfy the previously existing statutory requirement calling for 
full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.77 
While the language of that amendment specifically limited its 
applicability to that "subchapter," the Court did, nevertheless, 
subsequently import the same meaning into the full-and-adequate-
consideration provision of the separate subchapter covering the 
gift tax act.78 However, the two situations may not be exactly paral-
lel, for the Court there also seemed to think that it would have 
reached the same result under the full-and-adequate-consideration 
clause of the gift tax act even in the absence of this amendment 
of the estate tax act. 
The problem considered by this article will not be adequately 
solved even if this statutory gift-tax principle is imported into 
the contemplation-of-death provision. The new amendment re-
76 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, AND EsrATE TAXATION §52.03 (10) 
(1954) assumes that the new principle of the gift tax chapter will be imported into the 
estate tax act. 
77 Revenue Act of 1932, §804, reflected later in I.R.C. (1939), §812 (b), now in I.R.C., 
§§2053 (d) and 2043 (b). 
78 Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 65 S.Ct. 655 (1945). 
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lates only to cases which satisfy certain cumulative requirements, 
that is, relates only to joint interests (1) in real property, (2) be-
tween husband and wife, (3) which are created or enlarged after 
the effective date of the 1954 code, and (4) where the donor fails 
to elect in a gift tax return to treat the creation of the tenancy as 
a present gift. The first and third of these, limiting that provision 
to real property and even then to estates created after, or to the 
equity enlarged after, the effective date of the new code, provide 
blind spots of significant proportions. An adequate marriage 
between the contemplation-of-death principle and the joint-prop-
erty provision will, therefore, require something more, either 
from the judiciary or the Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
· Admittedly, a taxpayer does have the right "to decrease the 
amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid 
them, by means which the law permits."79 But except as this indi-
cates, as the Supreme Court intended, that the taxpayer's motive 
in fixing the shape of his affairs is usually irrelevant,80 the quoted 
statement is not very useful in resolving specific cases like the one 
under consideration. It begs the pivotal question. The central 
issue remains: what does the law permit?81 In determining this, 
obviously the judiciary's function is to implement the legislative 
prescription, not to undo that which Congress has done. Accord-
ingly, in determining the thrust of the contemplation-of-death 
provision, appropriate importapce must be attached to its exact 
language. But there is also another important policy which is 
sometimes spoken of as though it were cast in a competing role. 
On one occasion, the Supreme Court put it as follows: 
"But the true meaning of a single section of a statute in a 
setting as complex as that of the revenue acts, however pre-
cise its language, cannot be ascertained if it be considered 
apart from related sections or if the mind be isolated from 
79 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 at 469, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935). 
80 Sometimes, of course, it is quite relevant. The statute itself makes it relevant under 
the contemplation-of-death provision with reference to the death duty treatment of inter 
vivos gifts. I.R.C., §2035. Also in the very case wherein the quoted remark was made by 
the Supreme Court, the taxpayer was deprived of the tax advantage which the literal 
words of the statute accorded him. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935). 
81 See Judge Clark's dissent in Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1956) 232 F. 
(2d) 118 at 128. See also Eisenstein, "A Case of Deferred Compensation," 4 TAX L. REv. 
391 (1949). 
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the history of the ... tax legislation of which it is an integral 
part."82 
21 
While the broad outlines of the two foregoing rules of con-
struction are clear enough, abstract statements of those standards 
do not precisely identify the result which should be reached in a 
specific case. For example, what does the law permit when the 
language of one section might well be so construed, when isolated, 
as to fall short of fulfilling the logical function of that section 
when it is read in the context of the philosophy of another, per-
haps related, section? More specifically, exactly how clear must be 
the general purpose of the whole statute and the so-called literal 
meaning of one section for· the former in a given instance to affect 
the latter in the necessary degree to resolve the specific case? 
In the more or less twilight type of case, the judiciary should 
resolve the matter by balancing the interests reflected in each of 
the two loosely woven rules of construction. The goal, of course, 
is to determine the manifested congressional purpose. 
This method, one of balancing, provides the real explanation 
for such otherwise unrelated Supreme Court cases like Helvering 
v. Clifford83 and Commissioner v. Tower.84 The weight to be 
assigned in any given case to each of those principles, when they 
seem to be cast in somewhat competing roles, becomes a question 
of degree. And because it is just such a question, little differences 
in the setting,85 in the degree to which application of each serves 
clearly to prove the congressional purpose,86 or in judges, can 
count for much.87 
This is aptly illustrated by comparing the problem in the 
Tower and Cliffora cases with the problem central to this article. 
82 Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121 at 124, 55 S.Ct. 60 (1934). 
83 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940), dealing with short term trusts with reference to 
which the grantor retained a substantial reversion and significant powers of management. 
84 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946), wherein a family partnership was ignored for 
tax purposes though it was valid under local law. Cf. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 
U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949). 
811 Cf. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58 (1930), with Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 
111, 50 S.Ct. 241 (1930). 
86 In Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559 (1938), the literal language of the 
statute was directly opposite to a statement made on the floor by the spokesman for the 
House Ways and Means Committee. Since the Congress hurriedly passed the new provi-
sion on the basis of the oral statement and without even waiting for the bill itself to be 
printed and distributed to the membership, the Court felt that the oral statement should 
take priority in representing the manifest congressional purpose. 
87 Cf. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (1949, with Commis-
sioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946). 
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There, in an income tax context, the Supreme Court was really 
weighing the relative significance of the basic purposes of the 
income tax law, gleaned by it from the progressive rate structure 
and old section 22 (a) which defined gross income,88 against the 
seemingly contrary thrust, if applied to those cases, of other lan-
guage which dealt specifically with partnerships89 and trusts.90 In 
balancing the interests of the two competing principles, effect was 
finally given to what the Court believed to be the basic purposes 
of the law. This was accomplished by saying that the language of 
the partnership and trust provisions, though literally applicable, 
did not apply to those particular cases. The consequence was that 
taxpayers were denied the opportunity to get away with some-
thing which many thought Congress by those specific sections had 
literally permitted. 
While the result which followed there from balancing the 
interests of the two principles previously described is now clear, 
the extent to which a given court in a somewhat different case 
will emphasize one to the prejudice of the other is not at all clear. 
Again little differences may count for much. In the Tower and 
Clifford cases the Court was asked to say that a provision contain-
ing broad language, old section 22 (a), overrode another section., 
the specific and more narrow language of which was literally ap-
plicable. In making its choice, i.e., in choosing to support what it 
gathered was the basic purpose of the act, the Court was clearly 
aided and comforted by the exceedingly sweeping character of 
the language of the broader provision. In our situation, on the 
other hand, we are asking whether a court should impute a tax 
notion of ownership to language unfortunately narrow when read 
in the strict property sense in order more fully to effectuate the 
underlying purpose which provided the only justification for that 
section. For how much should this difference count? 
Actually, of course, the relevance of that difference need not 
be considered in a vacuum. Before such a court also should be the 
reaction of an earlier high Court, reflected in the Field case, to 
the key phrase, common then to the contemplation-of-death and 
the possession-and-enjoyment paragraphs of the same subsection, 
88 Now I.R.C., §61. 
so I.R.C. (1939), §182 et seq., now in I.R.C., §702. A special provision which now 
deals with the problem of that case appears in I.R.C., §704 (e). 
90 I.R.C. (1939), §161 et seq., now as modified, I.R.C., §641 et seq. Special provisions 
have now been added to deal with the problem posed by that case. I.R.C., §673 et seq. 
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which read "interest ... of which the decedent has ... made a 
transfer." The view there expressed by certain justices who were 
all too prone in tax cases to lay down broad abstract principles91 
was that those words reflected the property and transfer concepts 
which prevailed under local law. It was one thing, however, for 
the Supreme Court to say this in an effort to show that the language 
in question should not be construed to reflect a special tax concept, 
relating to powers of appointment, which Congress itself did not 
concoct until later, after that decedent had died. It would be some-
thing else again to say that the contemplation-of-death provision 
was also a stranger to those special tax concepts which were en-
acted simultaneously with it. This difference furnishes an intelli-
gent, though not necessarily compelling, basis by which the Field 
case could be distinguished by present-day justices who have 
already indicated elsewhere, though not always consistently, a 
belief in empirical case-by-case analysis and a reluctance to attach 
a magic quality to earlier generalizations.92 
Even more favorable to the government's position is the sig-
nificance which might well be attached to the negative approach 
made by the Congress in the Technical Changes Act of 1949.93 
Its forc;e here is to be distinguished from that of earlier in-
stances where newly enacted tax concepts of ownership and trans-
fer were affirmatively linked to the contemplation-of-death prin-
ciple by special language incorporated in the body of the new 
subsections. The different, i.e., the negative, approach of the 
Technical Changes Act would seem to demonstrate that Congress 
contemplated that the general contemplation-of-death provision 
itself embraced at the very least the federal tax concept of 
ownership and transfer reflected in the retained-life-estate provi-
sion. To that extent, a court as a minimum should treat the 1949 
statutory language as an implied amendment of the meaning to be 
attached to that phrase in the contemplation-of-death provision 
which reads "interest . . . of which the decedent has . . . made a 
transfer."94 And since the prescription ~here was accomplished by 
91 See the analysis of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920), and its 
aftermath in Wright, "The Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme 
Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts," 8 STAN. L. REv. 164 (1956). 
92 See, e.g., Justice Frankfurter's approach in Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 
67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947). Cf. Justice Warren's approach in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co., 348 U.S. 426, 75 S.Ct. 473 (1955). 
93 Act of October 25, 1949, P .L. 378, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 63 Stat. L. 891, §8. 
94 Now I.R.C., §2035. 
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use of negative phraseology, reinforced by a double negative, there 
would seem to be no substantial reason to suppose that the legis-
lative supposition contemplated the attribution to that phrase of 
one congressionally acceptable tax concept of "interest" and not 
another. At least this should be true in the case of other tax con-
cepts of ownership and transfer (illustratively that of the joint-
property provision) to which the Congress is equally committed 
and the justification for which is equal to that of the retained-life-
estate provision.95 
That the justification for the transfer concept of the joint-
property provision is equal to that of the retained-life-estate pro-
vision is important only because it deprives the Tax Court of a 
distinction which it has been willing to draw elsewhere. That 
court recently indicated that the key phrase quoted above, when 
repeated in different subsections, did not carry the same meaning. 
When it affirmed in 1955 that the meaning of that phrase was 
geared to local property law,96 it distinguished one of its early 
contrary holdings, 97 ignoring the others. 98 It asserted that in the 
earlier case the inter vivos arrangement entered into between the 
spouses regarding their jointly held property, and in contempla-
tion of the husband's death, was accompanied also by their reten-
tion of a joint power of revocation. 
Attempted reconciliation of the cases on this basis means that 
the key phrase, "interest ... of which the decedent has ... made 
a transfer," which serves also to limit that subsection dealing with 
revocable transfers,99 does in that context incorporate the tax 
concept of ownership reflected in the joint-property provision 
though the opposite is said to be true of ~hat phrase when lodged 
in the context of ·the contemplation-of-death principle. This is not 
the only situation in which the courts have indicated, and perhaps 
quite properly, that the Congress is most closely wedded to the 
basic philosophy of the revocable-transfer section and that fulfill-
ment of its legitimate function requires that it be given the broad-
95 The latter is justified on the ground that the decedent retained the entire income 
or use of the property until the moment of his death. The former is justified on the 
theory that while he retained only one-half of the income or use for that period, he also 
retained a chance until his death of recapturing the entire corpus. 
96 Estate of A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. No. 70 (1955). 
97Estate of William MacPherson Hornor, 44 B.T.A. 1136 (1941) (nonacq.), affd. (3d 
Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 649. · 
98 Estate of Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), revd, by (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 
657; Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943) (acq.). 
99 I.R.C. (1939), §811 (d), now I.R.C., §2038. 
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est possible meaning.100 However, in resolving the basic question 
with which this article is concerned, it is doubtful that the varying 
degrees of congressional devotion to different tax concepts of 
ownership justifies the judiciary in treating the contemplation of 
death section as a stranger to the jointly held property provision. 
After all, Congress has indicated by the Technical Changes Act of 
1949 that it did not consider the transfer principle in the retained-
life-estate subsection as a stranger to the contemplation-of-death 
provision. Why should we suppose otherwise in the case of another 
equally legitimate theory of ownership contained in -the jointly-
held property provision? 
From the foregoing considerations, it appears on balance that 
the congressionally manifested purpose favors that construction of 
the contemplation-of-death provision which incorporates in it the 
ownership and transfer doctrine contained in the joint-property 
provision. But there is room here for a difference of opinion. One 
cannot say that the Tax Court was clearly wrong in treating the 
two provisions as strangers. Because the basic question is of that 
type, and because the tendency of the lower courts is to favor the 
100 That the Congress does not think such trusts have much substance is evident from 
the fact that from an early date the corpus has been included in the transferor's gross 
estate [Revenue Act of 1924, §302 (d), now as revised, I.R.C., §2038] and the income 
therefrom was taxable to him until his death. Revenue Act of 1924, §219 (g), now as 
revised, I.R.C., §676. By way of comparison, while the former is true in the case of certain 
gifts in contemplation of death (I.R.C., §2035), the latter is not. 
In any event, on the one hand, the Tax Court has held that the pivotal statutory 
phrase around which this article is written served in a contemplation-of-death context 
to exclude from the gross estate the income from a corpus which was accumulated after 
the original transfer. Estate of James E. Frizzell, 9 T.C. 979 (1947), reh. 11 T.C. 576 
(1948), affd. Burns v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 739. However, that court 
has reached a contrary result with reference to the accumulated income of a trust over 
which the transferor retained a power of revocation. Estate of E. A. Showers, 14 T.C. 902 
(1950), remanded and vacated per stipulation of the parties, (5th Cir. 1951) 51-2 U.S.T.C. 
,rl0,832; Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949). Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of 
James D. McDermott, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 665; Estate of Daniel Guggenheim, 40 
B.T.A. 181 (1939), modified and affd. (2d Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 469, cert. den. 314 U.S. 
621, 62 S.Ct. 66 (1941). 
The effect under the estate tax act of reaching the accumulated income of a revocable 
trust is to treat such transferred property as though it would have been embraced by 
I.R.C. (1954), §2033. However, the Supreme Court has indicated that §2033 would not, 
standing alone, have reached property now covered by the revocable-transfer section. See 
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 53 S.Ct. 451 (1933). 
Any implication from this, that the contemplation-of-death provision would not have 
embraced the ownership and transfer principle of the revocable-transfer section, would 
not demonstrate that the contemplation-of-death principle should also be a stranger to 
the joint-held property transfer concept. All that was said above about the Field case is 
equally applicable here. 
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taxpayer who engages in what is obviously a "gimmick," this 
writer is led to say that immediate statutory revision is warranted 
to stop that tendency and thus to neutralize the gimmick. At the 
same time this will afford the Congress an opportunity to fix the 
relationship between the jointly-held property provision and cer-
tain other special tax concepts, such as those contained in sections 
2036, 2037, and 2038. 
